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De-democratization and institutional corruption threaten equality among the ex-
panding global market community. International treaties have been largely unsuccessful
because they are designed to favor the more politically and economically advantaged play-
ers. In addition to meeting these challenges, there are many additional benefits to be gained
from adopting the principles of the Fair Trade and Ethical Trading movements. Finally,
international law has an obligation to integrate the principles of social and ethical trading
movements to prevent the autonomous powers and transnational corporations from dom-
inating the traditional, less powerful markets and so that welfare increases for all.
INTRODUCTION
The Fair Trade movement has recently entered into mainstream trade. The
global sales of all fair trade products amounted to approximately £500 million (ap-
proximately $800 million) in 2003. Since then annual growth rates have been about
30 percent; total sales were $1 billion in 2005.1 This prompted the Economist to ask,
"Has the supermarket trolley replaced the ballot box?" '2 The article's answer was
"no" but the question posed raises a complex issue. The social movements have
championed fair trade as a contribution to "bottom-up" democracy and as a chal-
lenge to the prevailing international economic order. Fair trade is also a popular way
for consumers to express solidarity with those who work in poor countries and who
are particularly badly served by the system of "free trade" which has been constructed
* Janet Dine, Director, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, London.
Thanks are due to Dr. Michael Blecher for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Anja Osterhaus, World Trade Contradictions and the Fair Trade Response, in BUSINESS UN-
USUAL: SUCCESS AND CHALLENGES OF FAIR TRADE 29-48 (2006).
2. Voting with Your Trolley, ECONOMIsT, Dec. 9, 2006, § 2.
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by the powerful among the international community. The Fair Trade movement
operates on a number of principles with a general aim of relieving poverty. Space
prevents a full discussion of the principles here, but two of the most important are
the pledge to provide a purchase price for commodities above the price of production
at all times despite the fluctuations of the global market and the pledge to provide
pre-finance for producers. In both cases these mechanisms are widely unavailable as
a result of the liberalization of markets under international trade rules.3
I. FAIR TRADE AND THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
In the specific context of social movements, the exponential rise in numbers
attending the World Social Forum (WSF) meetings and the European Social
Forum (ESF) meetings is chronicled by Donatella della Porta. The World Social
Forum numbers rose from 20,000 participants in 2001 in Porto Allegre to attract-
ing 155,000 registered participants in 2005.' Della Porta argues that the funda-
mental driving force behind the social movements is a call to "reduce inequalities
produced by the market and search for a new democracy. '5 The ESF has specifi-
cally targeted the neoliberal policies on which the international trading system
has been based and which has led to the adoption of Fair Trade principles and the
popularity of that movement. The Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements
of the 4th European Social Forum, held in Athens on May 7, 2006 read:
Although the EU is one of the richest areas of the world, tens of
millions of people are living in poverty, either because of mass un-
employment or the casualisation of labour. The policies of the EU
based on the unending expansion of competition within and out-
side Europe constitute an attack on employment, workers rights,
public services, education, the health system and so on. The EU is
planning the reduction of worker's wages and employment benefits
as well as the generalization of casualisation. We reject this neo-
liberal Europe... we are fighting for another Europe, a feminist,
ecological, open Europe, a Europe of peace, social justice, sustain-
3. ALEX NICHOLLS & CHARLOTTE OPAL, FAIR TRADE: MARKET-DRIVEN ETHICAL CONSUMPTION
39-40 (2005).
4. Donatella della Porta, The Emergence of European Movements? Civil Society and the EU 4
(June 30, 2007) (unpublished paper circulated at the European University Institute seminar "Gover-
nance, Civil Society and Social Movements," available at http://eui.eu/LAW/Events/CJ1114.pdf).
5. Id. at 6.
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able life, food sovereignty and solidarity, respecting minorities'
rights and the self-determination of peoples.6
One particular target of the ESF has been the European Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs) negotiated between ex-colonial countries and the European Union to
end preferences on commodities such as sugar and bananas. This was a particular
focus of the European Social Forum held in London in October 2004, when Traid-
craft7 led a campaign against EPAs. Fair trade is likely to play a vital role in mitigat-
ing the probable effect of the EPAs, particularly on the banana trade in the
Caribbean. The Fair Trade movement has succeeded in initiating a Fair Trade
Working Group within the European Parliament to "work towards the involvement
of Fair Trade demands into relevant political processes such as the EU sugar reform
and the revision of the Generalized system of Preferences."9 These preferences re-
quired revision following the "banana wars"'" and will be replaced by EPAs.
II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, DEMOCRACY AND FAIR TRADE
Research among participants of social movements showed a wide level of dis-
trust of representative democracy and "[a]mong other actors and institutions, we
might notice a strongly declining trust in the church and mass media, as well as in
the unions in general and a stable (low) trust in the judiciary and (even lower) in
political parties. Activists continue to trust instead social movements (and less,
NGOs) as actors of a democracy from below.""
One of the tenets of the movements' 2 is that transnational companies are (if not
running the world) at least centers of unchecked power with no democratic control
6. Id. at 10 (citing the Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the 4th European
Social Forum, held in Athens on May 7, 2006 addressing the EU).
7. Traidcraft is a specifically Christian-based movement aiming to lift poor farmers out of pov-
erty by creating long-term trading relationships. It also campaigns to raise awareness of poverty.
8. E-mail from Anja Osterhaus, Advocacy Co-ordinator, Fair Trade Advocacy (Aug. 7, 2007)
(on file with author).
9. Id.
10. See generally BANANA WARS: POWER, PRODUCTION AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAS (Steve
Striffler & Mark Moberg eds., 2003).
11. della Porta,supra note 4, at 11.
12. Joshua Karliner & Ted Lewis, World Social Forum Conference on Transnational Corporations
(Feb. 1, 2002), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id = 1728.
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over them, a sentiment which has been explored in my earlier work. 3 The point
explored in the Economist article and considered further here is whether the Fair
Trade and Ethical Trading movements can influence trading policies and more spe-
cifically, whether that influence is democratic in nature. There is no doubt that con-
sumers can exert influence on company behavior,"4 although that influence will
always be limited by factors over which they have little control. These factors include
the fact that they must rely on the company providing vital information, which will
not be forthcoming if it is likely to adversely affect the company's duty to the share-
holders to "profit maximize." Nevertheless many companies have recognized that
the ethical shopper is a valuable target and have consequently stocked goods carry-
ing a wide range of certification marks which they are able to retail at a premium
price. To what extent this is likely to have a lasting impact on behavior of companies
towards stakeholders other than shareholders or corporate social responsibility gen-
erally is currently the subject of the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)
funded research at Queen Mary College. 5 The ethical trading movements have the
potential to assist in democratization and the debate should concentrate on the ex-
tent to which they should be recognized as part of mainstream political thinking
and legitimized by affording them a role in political decision making.
Ill. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?
Many contend that for a variety of reasons democracy cannot simply mean
churning out almost identical politicians every few years. 6 The ability of such politi-
cians to represent a wide range of possibilities has been severely eroded by a number
of factors, some stemming from the "willing capture" of the state, 7 others from glo-
13. See generally JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005)
(examining the effects ofglobalization on the relationships between human rights, property rights,
and capitalist economies); JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS (2000) (discuss-
ing how "groups of companies operating on a global basis and out of regulatory control" have all
but taken over the world).
14. See Purnima Bose, From Agitation to Institutionalization: The Anti-Sweatshop Movement in
the New Millennium, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 213 (2008).
15. See generally QMUL-Fair Trade Project, http://www.qmul-fairtradeproject.org (last visited
Jan. 13, 2008).
16. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centred Constitu-
tional Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (Christian Joerges et al.
eds., 2004) (arguing that merely elevating actors such as MNEs into traditional governance is flawed
because the designers "cannot free themselves of the fascination of nation-state architecture").
17. DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 27-31.
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balization s and the ability of multinational companies to evade and supersede state
regulation. 9 These twin forces mean that the state is "on the side" of the multina-
tionals and, if state authorities deviate from subservience to corporate interests, they
are able to evade regulation" or leave. One of the consequences of the overwhelming
consensus about the "proper" economic path to success (which has loosely been la-
beled the "Washington Consensus") is the "dumbing down" of politics to a narrow
centrist band which is obsequious to "the market" and consequently to large market
players, most notably transnational corporations.21 This has led not only to the "mar-
ket state"22 but also to the fragmentation of power away from the traditional mono-
lithic state structures. Additionally, it has led to the blurring of the boundaries
between public and private realms, including public and private law.23 Regional and
international agreements have also achieved fragmentation.24 This has made gover-
nance structures more complex and less responsive to democratic pressures. Power
has become multicentric rather than monolithic,25 a transformation that has signifi-
cant consequences for democracy. Jos6 Saramango says:
18. See Christiana Ochoa, The Relationship of Participatory Democracy to Participatory Lawmak-
ing, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (2008).
19. It is well known that transnational companies are able to avoid state regulation by shifting
resources between members of the group and exploiting their power over developing countries. See
DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (1995); DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF
CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 13.
20. One example of this is the extensive use of offshore tax havens. See Peter Alldridge & Ann
Mumford, Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,25 LEGAL STUD. 353, 360-62 (2005).
21. For a definition see United Nations Economic and Social Council, Work on the Formulation
of the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations-Outstanding Issues in the
Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (E/C1O/1985/5/2, May 22, 1985) and discus-
sion in JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS,supra note 13, at 41-42.
22. Mary Ridell, Bishops Can't Bring Peace on Earth, THE OBSERVER, Dec. 29, 2002 (discussing
Rowan Williams' views on the market state); Marie Sansom, The New Leader of the Opposition?,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Feb. 27, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/feb/27/past.
comment.
23. Teubner argues that private law has become simply "juridification of economic action."
Gunther Teubner, The Private/Public Dichotomy: After the Critique? (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www
.re-public.gr/en/?p =99.
24. See NICK BERNARD, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 15-17 (2000);
Christian Joerges, Integration Through De-legalisation?An Irritated Heckler at 6-8 (European Gov-
ernance Papers No. N-07-03, lain F. Fraser trans., EUROGOV 2007), available at http://www
.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-07-03.pdf.
25. See generally Jan Aarte Scholte, Globalization and Governance: From Statism to Polycentrism
(Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 130/04, 2004)
(arguing that "contemporary large-scale and accelerated growth of transworld connectivity has
rendered the statist mode of governance unviable and encouraged the emergence of polycentric
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The world today behaves like a madhouse. The worst of it is that the
values we had more or less defined, taught, learned, are thought of as
archaic as well as ridiculous. Respect for the world: who is that im-
portant to? The human being should be the absolute priority. And it
isn't. It's becoming less and less so. It seems that it's more important
to reach Mars than prevent 13 million Africans dying of hunger.
Why would I want to know if there's water on Mars if we're pollut-
ing the water here on Earth, doing nothing to avoid it? Priorities
need to be redefined, but there's no chance of redefining those pri-
orities if we didn't confront the need to know what democracy is. We
live in a very peculiar world. Democracy isn't discussed, as if democ-
racy had taken God's place, who is also not discussed.26
Perhaps the discussion should begin with the understanding that markets are
not all-powerful. "Adam Smith's invisible hand-the idea that free markets lead
to efficiency as if guided by unseen forces-is invisible, at least in part, because it
is not there."27
Despite Saramango's despairing cry, there has always been intense debate
about what a democracy actually consists of and connecting the diverse threads of
democracy and the social and Fair Trade movements presents a formidable task. I
have chosen to try to cut through the complexities by adopting a novel approach to
the democracy question put forward by Charles Tilly. Tilly rejects the argument
that it is possible to identify a "borderline" between democracy and non-democ-
racy2" by an assessment of chosen factors such as those identified by Freedom
House.29 Instead, Tilly focuses his definition on state-citizen relations and argues
that democracy is always in a state of dynamic movement with constant pressures
toward democratization and de-democratization. ° "Democratization means net
movement towards broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding con-
(multisited and networked) regulation"), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/
research/workingpapers/2004/wpl3004.pdf.
26. Julie Evans, The Militant Magician, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 28, 2002, at 12 (quoting Jos6 Sara-
mago), available at http://books.guardian.co.uk/departments/ generalfiction/story/O,,865566,00.html.
27. Joseph Stiglitz, There Is No Invisible Hand, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 20, 2002, at 17, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,863426,00.html.
28. CHARLES TILLY, DEMOCRACY iX (2007).
29. See Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page =351 &ana-page
=333&year=200 7 ; TILLY,supra note 28, at 2-3.
30. TILLY,supra note 28.
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sultation. De-democratization, obviously, then means net movement towards nar-
rower, more unequal, less protected, and less binding consultation."'" In seeking to
uncover the causes of movement in either direction, he argues that there is a cru-
cial difference between capacity of states and the health of their democracy. Here,
capacity relates to a state's ability to implement its policies. "State capacity means
the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources,
activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those re-
sources, activities and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those
distributions."'32 Democratization depends on a complex interaction between the
democracy in the sense of broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding
consultation and capacity to deliver. Tilly's central tenet is that democracy cannot
be measured in the traditional ways which employ idealist, structuralist, or in-
strumentalist approaches.33 These he explains as:
[D]emocracy as an idea that someone (the Greeks?34 ) invented,
starting a centuries-long effort to implement the idea. We might
take the opposite tack, arguing that only the conditions of indus-
trial capitalism could support broad, equal, protective, and mutu-
ally binding political relations between states and citizens. We
might also think that competing models of government, once fa-
miliar to national elites, attracted different sorts of ruling classes,
and that some of those chose dictatorship and others democracy. 5
Tilly argues that attention should be paid to processes in order to identify the
movement toward or away from democracy. The processes he identifies are "in-
creasing integration of trust networks into public politics, increasing insulation of
public politics from categorical inequality and decreasing autonomy of major power
centres from public politics."36 The first process is encapsulated by the following:
[o]f breadth, equality, mutually binding consultation and protection,
integration of trust networks into public politics most directly affects
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Id. at 50.
34. Id. at 26 (pointing out that the breadth of participation is extremely suspect due to the fact
that the Greeks were slave owners and excluded women from politics).
35. Id. at 49.
36. Id. at 23.
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mutually binding consultation. To the extent that people integrate
their trust networks into public politics, they come to rely on govern-
mental performance for maintenance of those networks. They also
gain power, individual and collective, through the connections to
government that those networks mediate. They acquire an unbreak-
able interest in governmental performance. The political stakes mat-
ter. Paying taxes, buying governmental securities, yielding private
information to officials, depending on government for benefits, and
releasing network members for military service cement that interest
and promote active bargaining over the terms of its fulfilment.37
Trust networks "contain ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly
of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources
and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others."38
This could serve as a precise definition for both social movements as well as
the Fair Trade movement (and other ethical trading movements). As della Porta
found, the social movements were trusted to act democratically whereas partici-
pants had extreme skepticism about trusting traditional political levers and insti-
tutions. 9 The Fair Trade movement argues that "somewhere between the
anti-globalisation protesters in Seattle and theories in economics textbooks lies a
truly sustainable model for a trading system in which everyone benefits. Fair
Trade represents such a model."40 If this claim is justified, the Fair Trade move-
ment represents a concrete model for the social movements to campaign for, and
the championship of the movement by the WSF and ESF and the foundation of a
working group in the European Parliament shows that this is already underway.
We need to test the model and then discuss whether democratization would be
assisted by absorbing some of the lessons of fair trade at the national, regional, and
international levels; in other words, by integrating the trust networks represented
by the social movements, and in particular the ethical trading movements, fur-
ther into decision making. Before proceeding to do so, two other processes consid-
ered by Tilly must first be examined.
37. Id. at 95.
38. Id. at 81.
39. Especially voting mechanisms and including the formation of political parties.
40. NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 3, at 19.
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IV. THE ROLE OF INEQUALITY
The second process identified by Tilly as an indicator of democratization is
equality. Tilly argues that democracy works better if the political process has mech-
anisms which mitigate inequalities that are found in society. Where this does not
occur, that democracy is threatened.41 Thus the argument is not that democracy
cannot exist where there are significant inequalities, but that these inequalities must
not appear in the political arena. By categorical inequalities Tilly means "organized
differences in advantages by gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, community
and similar categories."' "Increasing categorical inequality threatens democracy be-
cause it gives members of advantaged categories means and incentives to:
" Opt out of democratic bargains
* Create beneficial relations with state agents
* Shield themselves from onerous political obligations
* Use their state access to extract more advantages from unequal
relations with non-state actors
* Use their influence over the state for further exploitation or
exclusion of subordinate categories, and thus
* Move their regimes even further away from broad, equal, pro-
tected, mutually binding consultation."'
Thus, this proposition argues that it is possible to have significant inequality
and rely on political magic tricks to isolate political decision making from that
inequality by mechanisms which do not reflect those inequalities in a formal
arena. This is only true to a very limited extent. Those who are starving do not
vote and even marginalization can breed despair at having any influence. 4
V. THE DEMOCRATIC IMPORTANCE OF ALL FORMS OF EQUALITY
Both Barbara Ehrenreich and Polly Toynbee vividly portray the "invisibility"
factor as part of the experience of poverty due to low pay in the United States and
41. TILLYSUpra note 28, at 111.
42. Id. (citations omitted).
43. Id.
44. See DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 5.
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United Kingdom respectively.4 5 James Fallows notes the lack of shared spaces and
services. In the United States
as public schools and other public services deteriorate, those who
can afford to do so send their children to private schools and spend
their off-hours in private spaces-health clubs, for example, instead
of the local park. They don't ride on public buses and subways.
They withdraw from mixed neighbourhoods into distant suburbs,
gated communities or guarded apartment towers; they shop in
stores that, in line with prevailing 'market segmentation' are de-
signed to appeal to the affluent alone.46
Toynbee writes,
London was a sadder, duller, more impoverished place.... Wher-
ever I walked, everything I passed was out of bounds, things be-
longing to other people but not to me.... This is what 'exclusion'
means, if you have ever wondered at this modern wider definition
of poverty. It is a large No Entry sign on every ordinary pleasure. 7
This polarization of society is neatly summed up in Naomi Klein's metaphor
of Fences and Windows to describe the separation of the haves and have-nots
(Fences) and the opportunities for hope (Windows).48
Such exclusion does not readily lead to political participation. Tilly appar-
ently discounts the effects of the way in which inequality and discrimination are
built into political systems in an institutional way, an issue discussed below in re-
lation to institutional racism and corruption. Further, the third process identified
by Tilly is the antithesis to the inequality issue.
45. See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA
(2001); POLLY TOYNBEE, HARD WORK: LIFE IN Low-PAY BRITAIN (2003).
46. EHRENREICH,SUpra note 45, at 217.
47. TOYNBEE, SUpra note 45, at 239.
48. NAOMI KLEIN, FENCES AND WINDOWS: DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF THE GLOBALIZA-
TION DEBATE xviii-xxvii (Debra Ann Levy ed., 2002). Klein argues that global society has created
many fences; "barriers separating people from previously public resources" both physical barriers and
virtual ones such as education being restricted by the charging of fees. Windows are signs of hope of
breaking down barriers such as the World Social forum and reclaiming public spaces.
DEMOCRATIZATION
VI. DECREASING THE AUTONOMY OF POWER CENTERS
The third process identified by Tilly as an indicator of democratization is
decreasing the autonomy of major power centers from public politics. A revealing
part of the discussion of this issue comes when Tilly deals with the de-democrati-
zation of Russia by President Putin: "Yet in one regard Putin may surprisingly
have been promoting longer-term changes that will eventually facilitate Russian
democratization. Although he was permitting Russian military dangerously broad
autonomy in the Caucasus, he was also subordinating capitalists who had acquired
extraordinary independence from state control." 9 Here Tilly makes a good point
but misses another. The control of corporate power by state authorities is a step in
favor of democratization; however, in most of the world state control is illusory. In
this respect, Tilly fails to acknowledge this point and appears to be operating in a
pre-transnational corporate world. Corporations not only Rule the World,5" but
they also have bought the politicians, if not with money then with economic argu-
ment and sheer economic power. The result of this is to corrupt the whole system.
Since democratic governments have come to believe that what benefits corpora-
tions also benefits their citizens, governments perceive themselves as existing to
encourage corporations in whatever it takes to increase profits. So democratization
by decreasing the autonomous power of corporations can only come by accepting
that an alternative approach to the economic system which decreases the reach of
corporate power and its elites is required. This can only be achieved by popular
pressure and raises very difficult questions about the extent to which social and
ethical trade networks should integrate with current political systems.
It is therefore arguable that the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe
have significantly de-democratized in recent years due to the failure to integrate the
social movements as significant trust networks, because of the increase in inequality,
and because of the "willing capture" by companies of the "market state" giving sig-
nificant autonomous power to corporations. Can the ethical trading movements,
and in particular the Fair Trade movement, make a difference to this trajectory?
VII. ETHICAL TRADING V. CORPORATE STRUCTURES
As mentioned above, the Economist recently posed the following non-question
in an attack on the Fair Trade movement: "Has the supermarket trolley dethroned
49. TILLY,sUpra note 28, at 137.
50. See KORTEN,Supra note 19, at 12; JOHN PILGER, THE NEw RULERS OF THE WORLD 2 (2002).
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the ballot box? " The thesis of the piece was that ethical choices were next to impos-
sible and that conventional politics supplies the only route to world salvation. In a
further attack, Max Hastings accused Fair Trade and organic movements of ped-
dling "quack remedies" and indulging "the almost unlimited gullibility of well-
meaning consumers."'2 However, as Ian Bretman pointed out, ethical shopping,
however imperfect, brings the wishes of consumers to the attention of politicians
and puts fairness on to the political agenda:
Most people ask, in the face of the apparent inertia of our political
systems, 'what can I do?' This is not instead of government action but
in addition to it. Their efforts deserve more than cheap sneers. Instead
of Scrooge's refrain of 'bah, humbug,' wouldn't a cheer for the good-
will shown by the world's ethical shoppers be more appropriate?53
There are indeed difficult philosophical issues surrounding ethical shopping.
To adequately examine these issues, more than a few newspaper sound bites must
be scrutinized.54 This paper explores the complex relationship between trade rela-
tionships built on a traditional basis and the poverty these are said to cause, to dis-
cover whether the claim of the movement to be a pattern for a possible replacement
economic system has validity and therefore whether it is time for decision makers to
acknowledge that social and ethical networks should be integrated into or should
drive decision making in order to promote democratization.
The growth of ethical "brands" is driving more and more companies to claim
the moral high ground in order to attract the "ethical dollar."55 This attitude appears
at first sight to be in sharp contrast to the way in which corporate governance rheto-
ric has previously built on the legal underpinnings of corporate design to create
companies allegedly with the sole aim of maximizing economic returns to share-
51. Voting with Your Trolley, supra note 2.
52. Max Hastings, We May Yearn to Be Green, but We Can't Afford to Be Gullible, THE GUARD-
IAN, Dec. 11, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/O,,329658924-103677,00.html.
53. Ian Bretman, We Shouldn't Sneer at the Goodwill of Ethical Shoppers, THE GUARDIAN, Dec.
13, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/O,,329660923-103677,00.html.
54. These issues are being explored by a team of researchers under the auspices of a grant from
AHRC. The ethical shopping issue is being explored principally by Dr. Andrew Fagan. See Andrew
Fagan, Buying Right: Consuming Ethically and Human Rights, in HuMAN RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON GLOBALISATION 115 (Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan eds., 2006).
55. Money which consumers are willing to spend if the product is believed to have some ethical
property, often over and above the usual market price of a particular commodity.
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holders.56 However, one significant question is whether or not companies are using
the ethical trading regime not to alleviate poverty or as a revolutionary new way of
trading but in accordance with their perceived goal of profit maximization. This
question has become much more important following the "mainstreaming" of the
Fair Trade movement. This saw fair trade products no longer traded exclusively by
Oxfam and other Alternative Trading Organisations but also available in main-
stream retailers such as the big supermarkets. Many of these are multinational com-
panies with aggressive marketing strategies. If the Fair Trade and ethical trading
movements are comfortable with the concept of profit maximization then it is argu-
able that they cannot be a pattern for an alternative trading system and they may
therefore have little to contribute to democratization.
However, it must not be forgotten that companies are simply a product of
human design. Companies are designed by societies and their profits underpin
much of our wealth. So when they strike bargains with evil regimes, repatriate their
profits, and sell us goods produced at low prices because of sweated or slave labor or
take excessive margins when retailing "ethical" goods, it is not because of the inher-
ent evil of the people that work in corporations but as a direct result of the legal de-
sign of corporations and the operation of the international legal system.57 The
U.S./U.K. model of companies has shareholders as the primary focus-the com-
pany must serve the interests of shareholders and directors are appointed and dis-
missed by shareholders. Nevertheless, directors are to act in the interest of the
company and usually owe no direct duties to shareholders. Since this structure does
not necessarily equate shareholders with the company, the company could be con-
strued as involving the interests of others. Additionally, the structure does not equate
shareholder interests with "profit maximization" and impose a duty on directors to
achieve such a goal. It would be interesting to trace the history of the assumption
that shareholder interests and profit maximization are coterminous, no company
law that I have ever seen makes this assumption. Nevertheless, recent discourse has
imposed the concept of profit maximization on the assumption that this is what
shareholders require and adopted the second assumption that shareholders and the
56. Profit maximization is not a legal term and has been constructed as an "expansionary prop-
erty claim" by reference to alleged shareholder ownership of companies. See DINE, COMPANIES,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 263.
57. There is no international regulation of transnational corporations. For the opportunities
provided by the international legal system see DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 97-166.
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company are one and the same thing.5 Such an understanding of corporate aims
has wide implications for corporate behavior since all considerations, other than
profit, are seen as "negative externalities" to be adhered to in a minimalist way or
bargained away if possible. It has also been one of the underlying causes of spectacu-
lar bankruptcies such as Enron and Worldcom. 51 Much of this focus has been in-
formed by the fiction that companies are "owned" by shareholders and the
consequent "strong" claim that shareholders have to protection of their "property
rights." We design companies according to this understanding." It is arguable that
these concepts are a "corruption" of a proper understanding of the role of corpora-
tions in society and that the Fair Trade movement might inform a less corrupt un-
derstanding of corporations serving the common good.
A. Corrupt Companies?
Carol MacLennan argues that the current behavior of companies represents a
form of institutionalized corruption, surely another indicator of de-democratization:
Market values, which have their root in a pre-industrial, liberal society
based upon democratic citizenship and agrarian, small business enter-
prises, have morphed into a new ethic of corporate capitalism which
no longer resembles the business culture of the past .... Corporate be-
havior in the US has become increasingly 'corrupt' and the behavior of
officials in the Enrons and Worldcoms is not isolated.... it is pervasive
and institutionalised. That means, it is more than criminal behavior
by a few bad actors in an otherwise clean enterprise. It is institutional-
ized in the everyday world-view and processes of corporate action.6
MacLennan's study is principally into the close networks which link the po-
58. That is that the company exists solely for the benefit of shareholders and/or that the com-
pany is "owned" by the shareholders. See Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder
Ownership, 62 MOD. L. REV. 32 (1999); Paddy Ireland, Property and Contract in Contemporary Cor-
porate Theory, 23 LEGAL STUD. 453 (2003).
59. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM; THE AMAZING
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); Janet Dine, The Capture of Corruption, 20 PAC. Mc-
GEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J. 1 (2006).
60. Janet Dine, Using Companies to Oppress the Poor, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM, supra
note 54, at 48, 50-51.
61. Carol MacLennan, Corruption in Corporate America: Enron-Before and After, in CORRUPTION:
ANTHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 158 (Dieter Hailer & Cris Shore eds., 2005) [hereinafter CORRUPTION].
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litical and economic elites. However, she also notes that "Definitions of morality,
public interest and personal responsibility in corporate board rooms and executive
offices may in fact be quite different from those of the rest of the middle, working
and poor classes." '62 An interesting example of this is Jeffrey Skilling's (former
CEO of Enron) belief that he is entirely innocent of wrongdoing. 63 This is un-
likely to be mere denial and may well stem from an unholy mixture of the "alpha
male entitlement" syndrome, which leads powerful people (not always males) to
deny that the rules of ordinary life apply to them. MacLennan insists that:
[C]orruption implies something systematic, institutionalised and
perhaps endemic to an organisation or culture. It is pervasive, in-
fused or embedded in the system.... Corrupt or criminal behav-
iour is individual. If an alleged crime occurs, individuals are held
responsible and receive punishment through the courts. But cor-
ruption is institutional, patterned-perhaps criminal and unethi-
cal from outside, but not necessarily perceived as such by insiders.
All of the attention to the individual criminal executive is a detour
from figuring out how corruption works. An example is the cover-
age of the prosecution of Enron's executives, Chief Executive Offi-
cer Jeffery Skilling and Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow.
All eyes are on the courtroom ... and on possible jail sentences-
thus isolating the executive as the criminal. The corporate culture
that bred corruption, and the social expectations of the elite that
ruled the organisation, have escaped scrutiny.6
4
Can this model of corporations and consequent profit maximization behav-
ior survive any significant onset of ethical consumerism? Or will the profit motive
simply capture the ethical market and exploit it for its own ends? Will companies
have to adopt some form of corporate social responsibility in order to attract cus-
tomers and avoid boycotts? Would the adoption of ethical trading concepts assist
democratization?
62. Id. at 163.
63. Profile: Jeffrey Skilling, BBC NEws, Oct. 23, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/6077062.stm.
64. MacLennan, supra note 61, at 164-65.
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B. Fair Trade and Free Trade
In order to make a case for the importance of protecting and supporting the
Fair Trade movement it is necessary to show why the international trading re-
gime is unethical, thus prompting an "ethical alternative." In Companies, Interna-
tional Trade and Human Rights65 I argue that this is indeed the case and that the
system has been designed by governments who are in "willing capture" to the in-
terests of the big corporations whose interests they see as aligned with those of the
home state of the giant corporations. Here I will argue further that the design of
the international trading regime amounts to institutional corruption and does,
indeed, require a strong ethical response.
VIII. THE INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING REGIME
Recently, we have heard a great deal about the evils of corruption, to the extent
that "corruption is often discussed in the kinds of language and symbolism reserved
for life-threatening diseases."6' The World Bank insists that it "has identified cor-
ruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development."' Steven
Samson notes: "In the last five or six years, anti-corruption practices have diffused
transnationally and have become organized globally. We have seen the emergence
of a world of anti-corruption with its own actors, strategies, resources and practices,
with its heroes, victims and villains. 68 Samson moots two possible explanations for
this powerful recent emergence of the anti-corruption movement. First, he argues,
"The fight against corruption is virtuous, and those who form part of the anti-cor-
ruption community' are thus 'integrity warriors."'6 9 However, definitions of corrup-
tion vary. One definition of corruption was put forward by Edward Banfield in
1975. He described corruption as a relationship between three parties: the public as
principal, the public official as agent obligated to fulfill the wishes of the principal,
and a third party seeking to have the agent work on their behalf instead. 0 Many
65. See generally DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13.
66. MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION (2005).
67. WORLD BANK, A GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK 143 (2007).
68. Steven Samson, Integrity Warriors: Global Morality and the Anti-Corruption Movement in the
Balkans, in CORRUPTION, supra note 61, at 103, 106.
69. Id.
70. See Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organizations, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 587, 587 (1975).
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would accept that this is a perfect description of the international trade regime with
trade representatives who should fulfill the wishes of the people instead of acting
against their interests and favoring multinational corporations.7' However, this ig-
nores the fact that corporations have been designed and structured by society and
that the rich reap the benefits of their operations. In other words, it ignores the po-
larization of the world into those who benefit from transnational corporations
(TNC) activity and those who suffer. It relies on a state-centric view of the world
which would consider that acting for the public within a particular state would ful-
fill the duty of the official. In fact that also oversimplifies the issue as well, since even
in the richest nations the increasing inequality partially caused by TNC activity
means that the activities of trade representatives in promoting the power and wealth
of TNCs could be seen as corrupt by one part of the "public." For example, the
agency or call-center workers, cleaners, and caterers,72 while another part of the
public, comfortably endowed with pensions and savings, might, when considering
only their self-interest, consider their work to be beneficial.
While the system may be arguably corrupt, using the Edward Banfield defini-
tion, some have argued that a wider understanding of corruption should be adopted.
John Kleinig and William Heffernan reject the Banfield definition of corruption:
It is not the predominant understanding of the term in the Oxford
English Dictionary; it leaves out much of what has historically been
deemed corrupt; and it relies on the superficial clarity of a private/
public distinction and an unexamined view of what counts as im-
proper use. Corruption is not the exclusive failing of public officers;
there may also be personal corruption, corrupt institutions, and
corrupt cultures.73
Arnold Heidenheimer distinguishes between black, white, and gray corruption.
Black corruption was perceived by both elites and ordinary people as fundamentally
detrimental to society, white acts were seen by both groups as of some benefit to soci-
ety, and gray corruption was viewed differently by elites and ordinary people.74
71. See DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS,Supra note 13 (especially
bibliography).
72. See generally sources cited supra note 45.
73. John Kleinig & William C. Heffernan, The Corruptibility of Corruption, in PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC CORRUPTION 3, 3 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2004).
74. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Introduction to POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 3,26-27 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed., 1970).
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This paper argues that, while the international trading system is arguably
corrupt under the classic Banfield definition, it is most certainly a form of institu-
tional corruption. This concept follows the McPherson understanding of institu-
tional racism which found that some institutions are captives of historic prejudice
so that the way in which they operate inevitably disadvantages some sector of so-
ciety.75 In response to the murder of a black headmaster, Stephen Lawrence and
the subsequent bungled police investigation, the McPherson report found that the
police force was infected with institutional racism. Citing Dr. Benjamin Bowling,
the report agreed that
institutional racism is the process by which people from ethnic mi-
norities are systematically discriminated against by a wide range of
public and private bodies. If the result or outcome of established
laws, customs or practice is racially discriminatory then institu-
tional racism can be said to have occurred. Although racism is
rooted in widely shared attitudes, values and beliefs, discrimina-
tion can occur irrespective of the intent of the individuals who
carry out the activity of the institution.7 6
The report went on to adopt the following definition of institutional racism:
The collective failure of an organization to provide... an appropri-
ate and professional service to people because of their colour, cul-
ture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes,
attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through
unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereo-
typing which disadvantage minority ethnic people.77
Now it is indeed arguable that the way in which the international trade system
has been constructed is racist.78 However, the point made here is that it is also institu-
tionally corrupt. That is, the prejudices of the powerful have caused them to craft
laws which systematically discriminate against the poorest people on earth and that
75. HOME DEPARTMENT, THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY (Feb. 1999), Cm. 4262-I, at 6,avail-
able at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm42/4262/4262.htm.
76. Id. at 6.33.
77. Id. at 6.4.
78. See Fernne Brennan, Time for a Change: Reforming WTO Rules to Take Account of Repara-
tions, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM, supra note 54, at 254.
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this comes within a number of definitions of corruption.79 In the case of the interna-
tional trading system, the design is a result of "capture" by incoherent economic
dogmas which do not take account of reality. Thus, the design of the International
trading system is itself a form of corruption which has been systematically defraud-
ing the majority of the public for many years via public officials who have put in
place a pernicious trading system which favors the wealthy minority over the poor
majority. While clearly this cannot be "black" corruption in Heidenheimer's terms,
since there is a fundamental divide between elites and the majority of ordinary pub-
lic, the "Global crisis" I described in Companies, International Trade and Human
Rights" has been designed for us by elite public officials, themselves captured by
economic dogma and thus comes squarely within the concept of institutional cor-
ruption. It also comes squarely within yet another definition of corruption-J. Peter
Euben argues from the basis of the Oxford English Dictionary which associates cor-
ruption with a cluster of words-"decay, degeneration, disintegration, and
debasement."'1 Degeneration, disintegration, and debasement are clearly found as a
result of the rules of international commercial law which have the following effects.
Using almost any statistics "we certainly know that the problem of world
poverty is catastrophic." Of 6.133 billion human beings, in 2003-06:
* 799 million are undernourished,83
* 50,000 humans daily die of poverty related causes,84 and
a "the global poverty death toll over the 15 years since the end of
the Cold War was around 270 million, roughly the population
of the US."85
And the figures go on and on:
79. See J. Peter Euben, Pure Corruption, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION, supra note 73, at 53.
80. See DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 1.
81. Euben,supra note 79, at 55.
82. Thomas Pogge, The First Millennium Development Goal: A Cause for Celebration?, 5 J. HUM.
DEV. 377, 385 (2004), available at www.etikk.no/globaljustice/osloGlobal-Justice-mainlecture.doc.
83. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003: MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT
AMONG NATIONS TO END HUMAN POVERTY 87-88 (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al. eds., 2003) (published
for the United Nations Development Programme), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/
global/2003/.
84. Poverty-related causes include: starvation, pneumonia, tuberculosis, measles, malaria, and
pregnancy-related causes. See WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000: MENTAL HEALTH: NEW UNDERSTAND-
ING, NEW HOPE 46-49 (World Heath Organization 2001).
85. Pogge, supra note 82, at 386.
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* 34,000 children under 5 die daily from hunger and preventable
diseases,86
* 1 billion lack access to safe drinking water. 7
This is corruption on a grand scale by utilizing Rigged Rules and Double
Standards88 precisely as defined in the Oxfam report which bears that title.
The consequences of this for democratization are clear. Tilly accepts that in-
creases of categorical inequality are an important indicator of de-democratization
so even on his terms the system is failing to democratize. I would argue further
that institutional corruption in the system means that categorical inequalities are
increasing because, far from being ameliorated by political processes, inequality is
fostered and encouraged by them. This is de-democratization on a grand scale.
IX. THE METHODOLOGY OF CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW AND MARKET MECHANISMS
Before the recent extensive liberalization of the world economy, which has led to
the opening of markets and the abolition of many protectionist measures, the way in
which individual economies were run contained an element of planning and state
control. With the emphasis on building an open world economy the control mecha-
nisms operated by member states have been significantly reduced. 9 This has many
parallels with the opening of the markets of the Soviet Union and has similar social
and legal consequences, including changing the role of commercial law. In this case,
we are considering international commercial law, but there are significant parallels
with domestic commercial law. The role of commercial law in any market economy,
including a global market, is to allocate risk. Controlled economies attempted to
eliminate the risks of commercial transactions to individuals, transferring the risk of
failure to the whole community. The role of commercial law is simply to allocate
86. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, U.S. ACTION PLAN ON FOOD SECURITY: SOLU-
TIONS TO HUNGER iii (1999), http://www.fas.usda.gov/icd/summit/usactplan.pdf.
87. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2 0 0 3,supra note 83, at 103.
88. See generally KEVIN WATKINS & PENNY FOWLER, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS:
TRADE, GLOBALISATION, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY (2002) (discussing how the rules govern-
ing international trade are "rigged in favor of the rich"), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/
what we do/issues/trade/downloads/trade-report.pdf.
89. The member states of the World Trade Organization are constrained by the rules of that
organization. See generally, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) [hereinaf-
ter THE POLITICAL ECONOMY].
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parts of the economy to different operators. One factory might be told to produce
2,000 tractors, another 5,000 cars. The price will be fixed by commercial law. No risk
is undertaken by individuals. Economic failure is borne by the state. The move to a
market economy from a controlled economy changes the role of commercial law by
introducing the factor of individual risk. It thus entails complex political questions
about which market participants shall bear the risk of market transactions.
A very simple example illustrates this fundamental role: the law of contract. At
first sight, agreement between two individuals to buy and sell might seem a politi-
cally neutral transaction and the decision by the state to provide enforcement mech-
anisms to back such a transaction (such as sanctions for non-performance) might
similarly appear to be politically uncontroversial. However, immediately when any
disparity of bargaining power is taken into consideration, a state decision to provide
enforcement mechanisms will clearly benefit the party who started in the more
powerful position since that bargaining power will have been used to gain a more
beneficial bargain. Only if safeguards such as unfair contract terms legislation are
enacted to re-balance the equation can neutrality be regained. The same argument
works in exactly the same way at an international level. An agreement between
states with equal bargaining power may be considered to be politically neutral, but
when they are of disparate power the "contract" is of profound political importance.
In this respect, it is significant that the first quasi-judicial enforcement mechanisms
at the international level have been designed and operate to enforce international
commercial law and clearly favor richer nations with more diverse economies."0 It is
noteworthy that none of the least developed nations have brought actions under the
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding and those which
have featured complaints from developing countries are often initiated by TNCs9 '
It would be impossible for developing nations to use the eventual sanction of trade
retaliation against a powerful and diverse economy even if they were able to ignore
political threats and prosecute the action in the first place. In this respect, the ex-
treme pressure put on South Africa to alter laws put in place in 1997 to ensure a
supply of cheaper generic drugs to AIDS sufferers, as opposed to patented drugs,
which make huge profits for multinational pharmaceutical companies, is informa-
tive. South Africa is one of the more powerful developing nations, but came under
90. The sanction which may be imposed if a nation wins a case at the WTO is trade sanctions.
It is very unlikely that, say Gambia, could damage the U.S. or EU economies by imposing sanc-
tions. On the other hand a ban on peanut imports by either the European Union or United States
would devastate the economy of Gambia, which relies heavily on peanut export.
91. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale,
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 15:1
extreme political pressure to repeal the law although the public relations "own goal"
of suing Nelson Mandela eventually paid off and the drug companies withdrew
their case and paid the costs of the South African government.92
The design of international trade law bears an uncanny resemblance to the
way in which the English colonized North America. "The English could con-
gratulate themselves on the honorable way they were populating North America.
They could see the Indians growing poorer but they did not conceive that they
were the agents of the Indian's impoverishment. They were not taking the Indi-
an's land by force of arms, after all. They were buying it on the open market."3
There were transactions called "treaties," but of course they were not genuine
contracts, because the Indians did not consent to sell their land. Indians had dif-
ferent conceptions of property than the European settlers, so they could not have
understood what the settlers meant by a sale. The Indians were really conquered
by force, but Americans and their British colonial predecessors papered over their
conquest with these documents94 to make the process look proper and legal.95
One of the arguments put forward by proponents of the present system is that
the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a democratic system and that all na-
tions consented to the treaties which bind them.96 On the face of it the WTO has
highly democratic decision making processes where one objection could prevent a
decision being reached.
Moore argues that
the undemocratic claim is based upon a basic fallacy. The WTO is
not imposed on countries. Countries choose to participate in an
open, rules-based multilateral trading system for the simple reason
that it is overwhelmingly in their interest to do so. The alternative
is a less open, less prosperous, more uncertain world economy-an
option few countries would willingly choose. It is difficult to con-
92. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOGENETIC RESOURCES, AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE (2004).
93. STUART BANNER, How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 84
(2005).
94. In 1609, William Crashaw stated that "[a] Christian may take nothing from a Heathen
against his will, but in faire and lawfull bargaine." WILLIAM CRASHAW, A SERMON PREACHED IN
LONDON BEFORE THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD LAWARRE D3 (London, 1610).
95. BANNER,SUpra note 93, at 1.
96. MIKE MOORE, A WORLD WITHOUT WALLS: FREEDOM, DEVELOPMENT, FREE TRADE AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 103-04 (2003).
DEMOCRATIZATION
ceive of a system that could be more democratic... The multilateral
trading system works precisely because it is based on persuasion,
not coercion-rules, not force.97
Further,
All decisions-from the creation of the GATT to 2001's launch of
the Doha Development Agenda-have been taken collectively by
the Member governments themselves in the numerous councils
and committees, the most important of which is the Ministerial
Meeting. Each WTO Member has equal rights and an equal vote
under the agreements. Because no decision is taken unless all Mem-
ber governments agree, effectively every country-from the largest
to the smallest-has the power of veto.9"
However, some scholars see the WTO differently and deny that the WTO
treaties are any more consensual than the taking of Indian lands. "The outcome
of the Uruguay round was tainted by threats. The U.S., in particular, frequently
expressed (and demonstrated) its readiness to use 'Special 301' against countries
whose intellectual property regimes it judged to be weak. Such threats played a
role in producing the strong TRIPS [Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights]
agreement."9
The parallels with the conquest of the North American Indians are stark:
Any given decision on the part of Indians to sell land, like any decision
made by anyone about any subject, may be more or less voluntary,
along a continuum that lacks any dividing line between categories.
There is a large middle ground between conquest and contract....
Every land transfer of any form included elements of law and ele-
ments of power..., the more powerful whites became relative to Indi-
ans, the more they were able to mould the legal system to produce
9Z Id.
98. Id. at 105.
99. Brian Hindley, What Subjects Are Suitable for WTO Agreement?, in THE POLITICAL EcoN-
oMy, supra note 89, at 157,164.
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outcomes in their favour-more sales, of larger tracts, at lower prices
than would have existed had power relationships been more equal.1"'
As a result of the artifice of "consent," the powerful are comforted:
the Anglo-Americans could sincerely believe, for most of American
history, that they were not conquerors, because they believed they
were buying land from the Indians in the same way they bought
land from each other. What kind of conqueror takes such care to
draft contracts to keep up the appearance that no conquest is taking
place? A conqueror that genuinely does not think of itself as one.'
The WTO proponents similarly comfort themselves with the belief that the
trading regime has been democratically and consensually constructed. The end re-
sult of both processes is injustice.
Perhaps worse than the pretense of consent, the commitment to free trade
across the world is fundamentally violated by rich country protectionism of which
a small example is U.S./EU protectionism which in agriculture alone subsidizes
its own farmers to the tune of more than $20 billion per annum 2 and the system
systematically works against impoverished countries.03
This also has resonance with the experience of the North American Indians.
The English wrote, "After treaties are solemnly made, we fulfil, modify or abro-
gate them as suits our own convenience."'0 4
Alex Nicholls and Charlotte Opal discuss the reasons why the economic the-
ories on which the push to openness of markets has been based are flawed. The
theory of benefits flowing from free markets engenders market failure when ap-
plied to poorer countries, especially those with geographical and historical limita-
tions, the latter often the result of colonial exploitation.' The WTO system
depends on the theory of comparative advantage developed following selected
100. BAN NER,supra note 93, at 3-4.
101. Id. at6.
102. See generally Liz Stuart, Truth or Consequence: Why the EU and the US Must Reform Their
Subsidies, or Pay the Price (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 81, 2005) (discussing the multi-billion dollar
trade subsidies of the EU and US), available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/bp8ltruth-or
-consequences/download.
103. See WATKINS & FOWLER,supra note 88.
104. BANNER,supra note 93, at 251.
105. See generally NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 3.
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doctrines from Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Nicholls and Opal offer a lucid
and succinct description:
Under the theory of comparative advantage, countries export what
they are relatively good at producing and they import what they
cannot produce sufficiently. Mountainous Guatemala grows high-
quality cloud-forest-grown coffee. Japan manufactures technologi-
cally advanced electronic products. Opening up countries to
international trade allows Japanese electronics producers to import
delicious coffee, and Guatemalan coffee farmers to access high-tech
products. Under free trade, both parties are better off: international
trade is thus a win-win situation in which everyone benefits. Sup-
porters of free trade insist that the unfettered movement of goods,
services and finance between countries offers the most efficient
model of transactional business. Inherent in this is the understand-
ing that whilst some benefit, others will inevitably fail, but this still
works ultimately for the general good, weeding out the weak and
inefficient.0 6
The problem with this theory (apart from its environmental impact) is that
the macroeconomic conditions on which it is based are absent, especially from
rural agricultural societies, which were reduced to basic commodity trading as a
result of colonization. 7 In particular, the following conditions on which the mac-
roeconomic model is based are missing:10 8
* Easy market access
* Perfect information
* Access to financial markets
* Access to credit
* Ability to switch to other sources of income generation"'
* Strong legal systems and enforcement of laws" '
106. Id. at 17.
107. See DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 133-57.
108. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: How TRADE
CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT (2005) (providing a more detailed analysis of this issue).
109. See also id. at 171-214 (discussing the adjustment costs created by trade liberalization).
110. NICHOLLS & OPAL,SUpra note 3, at 18-19 (supplying convincing arguments under all heads).
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Probably the most fundamental of the difficulties identified by Nicholls and
Opal is the inability to switch to other sources of income generation. Nicholls and
Opal argue,
This is clearly not the case for the world's poor. Even if isolated
producers had access to price information, their ability to change
their source of income is limited. The 1.2 billion people who live on
less than $1 a day are extremely risk-averse. Switching from grow-
ing a crop that your grandfather grew to a higher-priced crop that
no one in your village has ever grown before is an extremely risky
activity. For families with no slack in their income and little by way
of savings, risk-taking is not an option."'
Producers of primary commodities are in a particularly vulnerable position, as
are the countries which depend on primary commodities for their export earnings. 112
John Keynes called for such commodities to be purchased "not at lowest price but a
level sufficient to provide producers with proper nutritional and other standards.""' 3
However, this philosophy has been lost in the drive to profit maximization and reli-
ance on "market forces." 4 Abandoning such an approach brings us back to the con-
cept of corruption, in particular the definition which associates corruption with a
cluster of words-"decay, degeneration, disintegration, and debasement.""' 5
It is therefore the general liberalization under the WTO agreements and
other trade agreements which may prevent the attainment of legitimate domestic
human rights policy goals. International commercial law fails in a fair attribution
of risk among peoples and would clearly fail the Rawlsian test of a policy designed
from behind the veil." 6
111. Id. at 19.
112. More than fifty developing countries depend on three or fewer commodities for over 20% of
exports. Food and Agricultre Organization of the United Nations, Declining Commodity Export
Earnings and Food Import Bills (2005), http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2005/89746/
article_89751en.html.
113. John Keynes, The International Control of Raw Commodity Prices, in THE COLLECTED WRIT-
INGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, VOL 27 167 (E. Johnson & D. Moggridge eds., 1946).
114. DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 41-96.
115. Euben, supra note 79, at 55.
116. For a detailed description of Rawls' theory, see generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
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However, establishing that the current regime is corrupt, unfair, and highly
undemocratic does not mean that its replacement is a simple matter. The Fair
Trade regime guarantees a price above the price of production and provided pre-
finance and calls generally for "fairness," but how can "fairness" be built into a
commercial operation?
X. CONSTRUCTING AN ALTERNATIVE, How CAN "FAIRNESS"
AND POVERTY RELIEF BE ACHIEVED?
A study published in 2005 by Oxfam GB, Novib Oxfam Netherlands and
Unilever gives details of a joint research project carried out between Oxfam and
Unilever and may give us some clues about how "fairness" can be achieved by
commercial operations."' Entitled Exploring the Links between International Busi-
ness and Poverty Reduction: A Case Study of Unilever in Indonesia, it has important
lessons for the Fair Trade movement, the corporate social responsibility move-
ment more generally, and for the assessment of the impact of business on the re-
duction of poverty and in achieving "fairness.""' This research looked at the
whole operation of an established company from producer to eventual consum-
er."9 Since the Fair Trade movement has as one of its objectives the reduction of
poverty and in order to achieve this it must counter some of the embedded cul-
tures of companies which operate to make a profit, this research focused on a for-
profit company goes some way to unravel the relationship between doing business
and the impact of a firm on poverty in the country where it trades.
The study looked at the impact of the company by tracing the products in
which the company traded from production to retail. The influence of the com-
pany is thus seen in a holistic light and not only in its effects on the employees or
persons most closely associated with the company. The study was, sadly, well situ-
ated as the report notes, "despite its abundant natural and human resources, In-
donesia has high levels of poverty, with more than 50% of its population living on
less than $2 a day. Poor Indonesians face insecure livelihoods, a lack of access to
POGGE, READING RAWLS (1989); DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 13, at 33-40; Thomas Pogge, Rawls on International justice, 51 PHIL. Q. 246 (2001).
117. JASON CLAY, EXPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND POVERTY REDUC-
TION: A CASE STUDY OF UNILEVER IN INDONESIA (Oxfam GB, Novib Oxfam Netherlands, & Uni-
lever 2005) [hereinafter UI REPORT], available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we do/issues/
livelihoods/downloads/unilever.pdf.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 26-27.
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basic services, limited opportunities for economic advancement, and a lack of
power to influence their situation."'20 In 2002, more than 25 percent of children
under five were malnourished, 45 percent of the population had no access to clean
water, and 15 percent of the population did not live to the age of 40.121
Unilever approached the research by styling itself as a "multi-local" company.
This is important, as it differentiates it from transnational companies in significant
ways. Unilever is signifying that it takes seriously the local context in which it is op-
erating. Truly global companies are much more indifferent to context and will make
decisions at headquarters level which are felt to be the correct ones for the group as
if it were a single entity, largely ignoring local concerns. Thus, if manufacturing can
be carried out more cheaply in another jurisdiction, a global company will move its
operations regardless of the impact on the jurisdiction that loses a factory. Unilever
Indonesia (UI) claims that such indifference to local concerns is not a factor in deci-
sion making.' There is significant evidence that this is the case, not least the re-
sponse to the financial crises of 1997-98. '23 However, Unilever's own introduction in
the report describes the business as consisting of "two parent companies, Unilever
NV and Unilever PLC, which, together with their group companies operates as
nearly as is practicable as a single entity.' 2 4 The difference between Unilever's for-
eign direct investment and so-called "butterfly" companies which can move their
operations rapidly is that the "local" companies are integrated into the local econo-
mies. They are not merely present to exploit cheap labor. Thus, while Unilever
"manufactures and markets food and home and personal-care products to consum-
ers in approximately 150 countries around the world... in 2004 its turnover was 40.4
billion euros and it employed 227,000 people,' 25 Unilever Indonesia employs more
than 3,000 direct employees and "virtually all management staff is Indonesian, as
well as eight out often Ul board members." 126 The business is deeply integrated into
the Indonesian economy. It is estimated that at least 95% of Indonesians use one or
more UI products every year."'27 Therein lies UI's claim to be a "multi-local' com-
pany. The lessons for fair trade as it moves into the mainstream of retail is that it
120. Id. at 12.
121. Id. at 30.
122. Id. at 66.
123. In 1997 to 1998, contrary to the likely response of a globally organized company, UI sought
to retain its workforce and responded sensitively to local conditions. Id. at 14.
124. Id. at 126.
125. Id. at 125.
126. Id. at 33.
127. Id. at 13.
DEMOCRATIZATION
must continue to "think local" and not enter the mindset of global marketers. This
will be particularly important in maintaining the indirect impacts of the Fair Trade
movement, which have been identified as
* Increased self-esteem
* Better relationships with Northern organizations
" Establishment and support for collective working"'
All of these indirect impacts are closely related to the definition of poverty estab-
lished by the Voices of the Poor study by the World Bank, which emphasized that a
significant indicator of poverty is the lack of control by the poor over what is happen-
ing to them.129 In 2003, Murray, Reynolds, and Taylor showed that the visits of in-
spectors and consumers and the increased attention to farming "promoted renewed
pride in coffee farming." This is supported by a number of other researchers. 3 '
The better relationships with northern organizations promoted by fair trade
has been shown to put producers in a better bargaining position for non-fair trade
sales and better ability to access development funds, bank credit and market in-
formation generally. 3'
The support for collectives may in some cases encourage increased civic en-
gagement and individual empowerment. However, the evidence is mixed with
some studies reporting entrenched group leadership and inefficiencies in struc-
tures.' However, it may be that this is only a reflection of universal human frailty
and not difficulties inherent in co-operative structures. The lack of power over
their own lives was not a matter addressed in a systematic way in the Oxfam-UI
report despite its importance as an indicator of poverty. However, the importance
of this indicator should not be neglected by those seeking to design an alternative
trading system since one result of philanthropy by companies is that, all too often,
the poor have "things done to and for" them without consultation. It must also be
understood that company decisions are never binding on successors so that a clinic
built in any country may not be staffed in the future if the company reverses its
policy. A company never has to consult locals before pulling out. A parent com-
128. NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 3, at 211-13.
129. The World Bank, Voices of the Poor, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/O,,contentMDK:20622514-menuPK:336998-pagePK: 148956-piPK
:216618-theSitePK:336992,00.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
130. NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 3, at 209.
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pany may put a subsidiary into liquidation for reasons of group efficiency regard-
less of the local effect. Corporate social responsibility programs have therefore
sometimes been criticized as inherently anti-democratic and may even undermine
fledgling democracies if the giver of the "good" is not open to influence by a dem-
ocratic process."
A. Impacts at the Macro-Economic Level
Despite its claim to be a "local" company, the Oxfam-UI report showed a sig-
nificant net outflow of funds from Indonesia.' This is usually facilitated by the in-
ternational trade legal structure which seeks to establish "open" economies with no
restrictions on capital flows and the "repatriation of profits." However, the findings
at the macro-economic level were by no means all negative. In particular, fewer than
5 percent of senior management positions were held by expatriates, which has impli-
cations for technology transfer.135 The company also responded responsibly to the
financial crisis of 1997-98. These strategies were an interesting mixture of social
responsibility and business survival. Recognizing that consumers must be able to
afford the products if the business was to survive, UI
* Expanded the number of its products available in small sachets
* Created new, less expensive formulations of popular products, and
* Substituted locally sourced ingredients where possible.'36
Three other responses to the crisis have lessons for the design of new trading
systems. UI renegotiated the margins of profit throughout the supply chain, retained
employees and focused on the local market rather than exporting for profit.' The
latter two strategies turn conventional wisdom of responses to crises upside down
but proved successful.
Of particular importance is the focus of the research on the whole operation
of Unilever, from producers of the ingredients of Unilever products, right through
to the eventual retail. Four issues stand out:
133. Source Watch, Corporate Social Responsibility, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php
?title= CorporateSocialResponsibility (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
134. UI REPORT, supra note 117, at 42, fig. 3.
135. Training of local personnel in the techniques of management is significant in providing
development potential within a country. See WATKINS & FOWLER, supra note 88.
136. UI REPORT, supra note 117, at 44.
137. Id. at 14.
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" The concept of sourcing direct from producers
* The impact of advertisements on poor consumers
* The points at which value was captured in the chain of supply
and distribution
* The conclusions that fair price and fair practice in commerce
are elusive and complex.
B. Direct Sourcing
Nicholls and Opal count as "Fair Trade Principle One: Direct Trade with
Producers."39 They state that "Fair Trade importers must, wherever possible, buy
directly from a farming co-operative, a farming estate, or a local producer group."'
39
The theory behind this is that it addresses market failures such as
* Exploitative middlemen who rely on lack of competition
* Lack of market information about price and product standards
* Lack of access to credit
* Inability to respond to market forces
* Weak legal systems permitting exploitative labor practices. 4 '
However, the Unilever study of a similar initiative shows a more nuanced picture.
In 2002, UI initiated a pilot study in relation to Kecap Bango sweet soy sauce. This is
based on black soybeans, coconut sugar and brine and the market was growing rap-
idly. UI moved to buy the ingredients directly from farmers. This was a great success
and farmers were anxious to join the scheme for the same reasons that fair trade cites:
security of markets, credit supplied by UI and availability of technical assistance via UI
funded University schemes. However, Oxfam points out that it also increased depen-
dency on a single buyer and undermined traditional credit and market relationships:
While these systems are exploitative at many levels, they also pro-
vide farmers with capital needed for non-farm expenses, for ex-
ample medical needs, school fees and the cost of weddings and
funerals. The new credit system provided through Ul is cheaper,
more efficient and interest-free to farmers, but it can be used only
138. NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 3, at 33.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 33-41.
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for expenses related to producing black soybeans. Oxfam considers
that farmers risk becoming over-dependent on UI for the sale of
the crops, and that they would be hurt by any decline in demand.
While producers may benefit from this new system, there are pro-
ducers and traders in the old supply chain who lose out by exclu-
sion from the new supply chain."'
Therefore, there are two matters to be investigated and guarded against: over-
reliance and the exclusion of middlemen, who, although often said to be exploit-
ative are perhaps unlikely to have an income comparable to a CEO of Tescos and
may lose a livelihood entirely by exclusion from the supply chain.
C. Impact ofAdvertising
This aspect may also have lessons for the Fair Trade movement. An important
point made by the Ul study was that
The debate about the ethical and social implications of extending
FMCG42 markets to people living on limited financial resources is
contentious and not easily resolved. It revolves around some basic
questions about wants and needs, whether there is a "right" way for
consumers to spend their money and to what extent consumer
choice is unduly influenced by advertising.143
The report raised a number of issues concerned with competition (there is a dan-
ger that big companies may push smaller local ones out of the market) and branding.'44
However of direct relevance to the Fair Trade movement is the discussion about the
role of advertising and the amount spent to promote a brand. Unilever regarded most
of its products as basic or essential because they promoted hygiene and healthy living.
However, for Oxfam there remains the question of how a product
can be defined as basic or essential when, for poor households, it
means purchasing less of something else that is essential for the
141. U1 REPORT, supra note 117, at 72.
142. Fast Moving Consumer Goods.
143. UI REPoRT, supra note 117, at 87-88.
144. Id. at 19-20.
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well-being of the household, like health care or education. Oxfam
questions whether it is appropriate to market FMCGs aggressively
to people living on limited budgets. Advertising runs the risk of
turning luxuries into necessities ... It is important to consider- but
difficult to measure-to what extent advertising shapes, rather than
responds to, consumer values and demand.'45
It is therefore important to revisit in some detail the impact of fair trade brand
advertising on poorer households in the North and consider to what extent the
refusal to buy Fairtrade products might become a stigma. Is fair trade aggressively
marketed?146
D. Value Capture in the Supply and Distribution Chain
The Ul Report found that the greatest value-added effect of Unilever's opera-
tions was felt closest to the company's own in-house operations. 47 This shows that
it is clearly important to investigate the distribution of values-added in the entire
operation, more especially since there has been criticism of retailers for exploiting
ethical consumers by pushing up margins on fair trade goods.48 This is a damag-
ing criticism which may strike at the root of the trust relationship between the
consumer and the Fair Trade movement.
E. Fair Practice and Fair Price
A significant lesson learned from the UI research was:
We also learned how difficult it is to reach a specific definition of
what constitutes 'fair practice' by companies. This issue is not as
clearly defined as we would like it to be. . . Similarly we debated,
but did not resolve, the concept of 'fair price' and the question of
how much expenditure on advertising is appropriate as a propor-
tion of consumer prices.'49
145. Id. at 96.
146. See Fagan, supra note 54, at 115.
147. UI REPORT, supra note 117, at 97.
148. Steve Stecklow & Erin White, How Fair is Fair Trade? That's Tough to Figure: Confusing
Labels Make It Hard for Shoppers to Know Where Money Goes, WALL ST. J., June 8,2004 at A10.
149. UI REPORT, supra note 117, at 21.
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The Oxfam-UI report makes it abundantly evident that the construction of a
"fair" system is a complex business. One difficulty in advocating the "integration"
of the trust networks which advocate fair and ethical trading is that much more
research needs to be done into what an alternative scheme would look like. The
detailed research carried out by Oxfam-UI needs to be replicated many times over
if the complexities are to be grasped and any replacement scheme constructed. It
cannot be designed on the basis of rather vague claims to "fairness." All too often
changing the rules means advantaging one impoverished group to the disadvan-
tage of another impoverished group. This is not to diminish the need for ethical
decision making in the arena of Trade law but to call for more detailed research in
order to construct a radical and detailed alternative to the present corrupt system.
In order to achieve democratization of the international regime we need not only
consultation, but also the resources to fund serious research into alternatives.
F. Why Would Democratization Increase Welfare?
Tilly argues that
Well being of subjects, on average, increases under democratizing
regimes partly because political insulation from inequality, inte-
gration of trust networks, and suppression of autonomous power
centers are goods in themselves and partly because the popular po-
litical voice that results from those processes is a good in itself. On
average, people who experience equitable treatment from their
governments and/or have direct say in governmental operations
gain more satisfaction from politics and display greater willingness
to bear burdens for the common good 5
The World Bank appears to believe that democratization (at least the compo-
nent of equal opportunity) is a foundation of economic development.'' If so, it is
surely scandalous that so little attention has been paid to democratization of the
international trading regime.
150. TILLY, supra note 28, at 184.
151. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 1-4
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CONCLUSION: WHAT ROLE CAN LAW PLAY?
This paper argues that the international trading system is both corrupt and a
force for de-democratization. The system has a framework of international trea-
ties which have been framed to benefit the powerful and exclude the weak. Law,
therefore, has a fundamental role to play in shifting the risks of the international
market economy onto shoulders more able to bear them. Such a shift would rep-
resent a profound move toward democratization. Such a shift needs to accept the
principles espoused by the social and ethical trading movements.
The role of law in the integration of networks was the subject of extensive de-
bate at a seminar in Florence on June 30, 2007. This posed the question
how can the law retain its legitimising functions once it is recognised
that problem-solving will require the cooperation of politically ac-
countable bodies with societal actors as well as a 'cognitive opening'
of legal discourses so as to ensure that scientific expertise and practi-
cal societal knowledge can come to bear in decision making.15
2
Teubner argues that "Elements of a civil constitution in the strict sense can be
spoken of only once an interplay of autonomous social processes on the one hand
and legal processes on the other come about." '153 Blecher calls for law to be open to
influence by the social movements.54 Hitherto WTO lawmaking has been notori-
ously resistant to influences other that those advocating free trade. In concluding his
book, Tilly argues that
de-democratization occurs chiefly as a consequence of withdrawal
by privileged, powerful actors from whatever mutually binding
consultation exists, whereas democratization depends on integrat-
ing large numbers of ordinary people into consultation. In more
complex terms, privileged, powerful elites such as large landlords,
industrialists, financiers and professionals have much greater means
and incentives than ordinary people to escape or subvert demo-
cratic compacts when those compacts turn to their disadvantage.
152. Joerges, supra note 24, at 7.
153. Teubner, supra note 16, at 6.
154. Michael Blecher, Law in Movement: Paradoxontology, Law, and Social Movements, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM, supra note 54, at 80.
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Once they have integrated their lives and life chances into demo-
cratic regimes, ordinary people can only with great difficulty de-
tach their trust networks from public politics.'
Tilly adds a warning:
if rich states dismantle the redistributive and equalizing arrange-
ments that have grown up within democratic capitalism and rich
people disconnect their trust networks from public politics by such
means as gated communities and private schooling, we should ex-
pect those measures to de-democratize their regimes. Such changes
would reinsert categorical inequalities into public politics, reduce
the influence of ordinary people over public politics and possibly
produce newly autonomous coercive centres of power as well. A
decline of relatively broad, equal, binding and protected consulta-
tion-de-democratization would be the unhappy outcome.'56
On the international stage, the growth in inequality, the polarization of
wealth and the exclusion from decision making of ordinary people as well as the
insulation from regulation of giant corporations reflects a deeply undemocratic
regime. It is time to integrate the principles of the social and ethical trading net-
works and recognize the possibility of the emergence of a new legal order driven
by the demand for ethical trading.
155. TILLY, supra note 28, at 195.
156. Id. at 204-05.
